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Re: [PATCH BZ#20422] Do not allow asan/msan/tsan and fortify at the same time.


* Yuri Gribov:

> Would the above approach be accepted for trunk? The reason for me
> pushing this is because FORTIFY_SOURCE is now enabled by default in
> major distros and this start to be a detrimental factor for ASan
> efficiency (there are already 3 open bugs related to this in tracker
> and they keep coming).

We have received a related feature request:

  <https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=20644>

Do the sanitizers depend on direct calls to the interceptors from
application code, or can we add an indirection which has been compiled
*without* sanitizer support?

If the indirection is acceptable, we could perhaps provided a DSO
which maps back the fortify wrappers to the unfortified versions.
libasan could link against that, for valgrind, it could be preloaded.

memstop could use this as well:

  <https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1034894>

The advantage of the unfortify library is that it keeps the knowledge
about fortify wrappers in glibc.


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