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[Bug runtime/5716] New: staprun/stapio setuid/capability simplification


Let's consider moving away from capabilities as the primary
means of limiting staprun's setuid privileges while a probe
module is actually running.  Considering that module loading
and unloading privilege can be reactivated at any time (at
least in the way we're using them, capabilities do not provide
any incremental security.  (An attacker might find a way to
trick staprun to reactivate CAP_SYS_MODULE early, then load
a hostile module, at which point the game is over.)

Since the only reason AFAIK for this complexity was to permit
module *unloading* at the end of a run, let's think of another
solution for this.  Perhaps something as simple as a cleanup
task like the old "remove ref-0 module" cron job could do it.
Or staprun could be made to stick around in the background as
a daemon as long as the module is needed, even if -L/-A type
detach/attach is subsequently done.  -L/-A could match the
lifetime of unprivileged stapio rather than staprun processes.

-- 
           Summary: staprun/stapio setuid/capability simplification
           Product: systemtap
           Version: unspecified
            Status: NEW
          Severity: normal
          Priority: P2
         Component: runtime
        AssignedTo: systemtap at sources dot redhat dot com
        ReportedBy: fche at redhat dot com


http://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=5716

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