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Re: [PATCH 05/18] Open-code the memcpy() at static TLS initialization time.
- From: Nix <nix at esperi dot org dot uk>
- To: Mike Frysinger <vapier at gentoo dot org>
- Cc: libc-alpha at sourceware dot org
- Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2016 15:13:52 +0000
- Subject: Re: [PATCH 05/18] Open-code the memcpy() at static TLS initialization time.
- Authentication-results: sourceware.org; auth=none
- References: <1457445064-7107-1-git-send-email-nix at esperi dot org dot uk> <1457445064-7107-6-git-send-email-nix at esperi dot org dot uk> <20160309224330 dot GE6588 at vapier dot lan> <87y49rkuye dot fsf at esperi dot org dot uk> <20160310022853 dot GH6588 at vapier dot lan> <87io0ulj74 dot fsf at esperi dot org dot uk>
On 10 Mar 2016, nix@esperi.org.uk stated:
> On 10 Mar 2016, Mike Frysinger verbalised:
>> should this also depend on SSP not being enabled ?
>> #if defined _HAVE_STRING_ARCH_memcpy || !defined <whatever SSP define>
>
> Probably a good idea: it makes things less invasive for the common case.
> (Though your belief that there is just *one* SSP define is alas untrue:
> we'll have to check all three.)
Heh. This has additional fun complications: all of csu/ is built without
stack protection, so we cannot rely on the macros the compiler
predefines to indicate that stack protection is on: for csu/, it's not,
ever.
So I do have to introduce a new #define here, to indicate that
stack-protection is globally enabled even if it's off for some file in
particular (easy to do in configure.ac etc: folding that part into patch
1).
--
NULL && (void)