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Re: [musl] RFC: adding Linux vsyscall-disable and similar backwards-incompatibility flags to ELF headers?
- From: Andy Lutomirski <luto at amacapital dot net>
- To: Rich Felker <dalias at libc dot org>
- Cc: Kees Cook <keescook at chromium dot org>, "linux-kernel at vger dot kernel dot org" <linux-kernel at vger dot kernel dot org>, libc-alpha <libc-alpha at sourceware dot org>, "musl at lists dot openwall dot com" <musl at lists dot openwall dot com>, gcc at gcc dot gnu dot org, Binutils <binutils at sourceware dot org>
- Date: Tue, 1 Sep 2015 20:39:27 -0700
- Subject: Re: [musl] RFC: adding Linux vsyscall-disable and similar backwards-incompatibility flags to ELF headers?
- Authentication-results: sourceware.org; auth=none
- References: <CALCETrUzU5UVe_2eWuMCOgHTs=5mnor5m0RO0STTi3K5FzdNvQ at mail dot gmail dot com> <20150902025440 dot GG17773 at brightrain dot aerifal dot cx>
On Tue, Sep 1, 2015 at 7:54 PM, Rich Felker <firstname.lastname@example.org> wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 01, 2015 at 05:51:44PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> Hi all-
>> Linux has a handful of weird features that are only supported for
>> backwards compatibility. The big one is the x86_64 vsyscall page, but
>> uselib probably belongs on the list, too, and we might end up with
>> more at some point.
>> I'd like to add a way that new programs can turn these features off.
>> In particular, I want the vsyscall page to be completely gone from the
>> perspective of any new enough program. This is straightforward if we
>> add a system call to ask for the vsyscall page to be disabled, but I'm
>> wondering if we can come up with a non-syscall way to do it.
>> I think that the ideal behavior would be that anything linked against
>> a sufficiently new libc would be detected, but I don't see a good way
>> to do that using existing toolchain features.
>> Ideas? We could add a new phdr for this, but then we'd need to play
>> linker script games, and I'm not sure that could be done in a clean,
>> extensible way.
> Is there a practical problem you're trying to solve? My understanding
> is that the vsyscall nonsense is fully emulated now and that the ways
> it could be used as an attack vector have been mitigated.
They've been mostly mitigated, but not fully. See:
I'm also waiting for someone to find an exploit that uses one of the
vsyscalls as a ROP gadget.
> If this is not the case, I have what sounds like an elegant solution,
> if it works: presumably affected versions of glibc that used this used
> it for all syscalls, so if the process has made any normal syscalls
> before using the vsyscall addresses, you can assume it's a bug/attack
> and and just raise SIGSEGV. If there are corner cases this doesn't
> cover, maybe the approach can still be adapted to work; it's cleaner
> than introducing header cruft, IMO.
Unfortunately, I don't think this will work. It's never been possible
to use the vsyscalls for anything other than gettimeofday, time, or
getcpu, so I doubt we can detect affected glibc versions that way.